We study how a firm's decision to offer bonds of various maturities affects the portfolio allocations of institutional investors. We argue that because of lower information-collection costs, institutional investors tilt their portfolios towards firms that offer bonds of various maturities. We show that this translates into lower bond yields, both in the primary and in the secondary bond markets. (JEL G12, G2, G32) Does the variety of bond maturities that a firm offers influence the demand for its bonds? For example, in 2007, IBM had thirteen bonds outstanding with twelve different maturities, ranging from 1 year to 89 years. Would bond investors view IBM differently if its thirteen bonds were instead concentrated in fewer (say, six) maturities? More importantly, can differences in the variety of maturities offered by the firm affect its bond yields? This is the question that we address in this paper. More specifically, we study whether offering a variety of maturities can affect the demand from institutional investors for corporate bonds and whether this induces differences in yields among otherwise similar firms.
information-collection costs twice. In contrast, if a firm issues bonds across the spectrum of maturities, then the institutional investor may focus on collecting information on these types of firms, thus enjoying a more efficient informationcollection process. 1 All else equal, this influence would cause the institutional investor to invest more in the firm that offers bonds of various maturities. We denote firms that offer bonds across the maturity spectrum as firms with a greater "maturity variety (MV)" or simply "high-MV firms." Larger institutional investors, by the sheer size of their portfolios, as well as investors that manage several portfolios specializing in different maturities (i.e., a portfolio only for short-term investments, another only for medium-term investments, etc.) are likely to hold bonds across many different maturities. As such, these investors would be particularly interested in high-MV firms because they would benefit from the lower information-collection costs. In contrast, smaller institutional investors or investors whose portfolios are concentrated in specific maturities (e.g., only short-term investments) will benefit less from investing in high-MV firms as these investors have fewer investment opportunities to use the various bond offerings of high-MV firms.
If the institutional investors optimize their information-collection costs by using the information about a firm's creditworthiness to invest in multiple bonds of the same firm, then their portfolio would be focused on fewer firms and thus more concentrated than the market portfolio. This is consistent with the evidence in the literature, which shows that for many investors information considerations can prevail over portfolio diversification motives, resulting in portfolios concentrated in fewer stocks (Kacperczyk et al. 2005) or in locally biased portfolios (Coval and Moskowitz 1999, 2001 ). Information considerations should be even more important for bond investment as the possibilities of exploiting the information about the same firm are numerous. Indeed, information on the default probability and credit riskiness of a specific firm can be employed for investing in bonds with different maturities and different contractual features. For instance, in the case of the previous example, information on IBM can be used for investing in thirteen different bonds across twelve different maturities. Also, given that information is often gathered at the headquarters of the institutional investor managing many funds (e.g., Elton et al. 2007 ) and exploited by different investment funds of the institution, the potential for information coordination among funds would make the aforesaid incentives stronger. All of these elements increase the benefit to investors from focusing on fewer firms that offer bonds of various maturities. This behavior of large institutional investors would be expected to raise the demand for the bonds of high-MV firms, especially from investors that hold bonds of many maturities in their portfolios.
The greater demand for the bonds of high-MV firms would have a direct impact on the prices of these bonds. Under market segmentation, firms spanning various maturities would enjoy lower yields. Evidence of bond market segmentation can be traced as far back as Modigliani and Sutch (1966) , who proposed the "preferred habitat" hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. In a different strand of literature (e.g., Krishnamurthy and VissingJorgensen 2012; Greenwood and Vayanos 2008, 2010; Greenwood et al. 2010; Ellul et al. 2011) , there is now more evidence that the bond market is segmented and that even temporary market-demand shocks have a substantial impact. This price impact would be possible even if some but not all of the investors exhibit a preference for high-MV firms.
We use data on U.S. corporations from 1998 to 2007 to study the relation between the maturity variety of firms and the investor demand for corporate bonds. We measure the degree of a firm's maturity variety using three different proxies, of which two are continuous and the third is a count variable. Both the continuous MV proxies account for the dispersion of bonds across the various maturities. For the third MV proxy, we divide the bond maturities into three "bins"-short, medium, and long-and then count the number of maturity bins that are filled by a firm. We elaborate on these definitions in Section 2.
We start by analyzing corporate bond holdings as a proxy for the demand from institutional investors. Because it is not possible to accurately observe the investors' true demand schedules, we proxy for it by using the institutional investors' "revealed preferences" through their holdings. To that end, we use four different proxies: a dummy for whether the investor holds any bonds of a firm; the weight of the firm's bonds in the investor's portfolio; the degree by which the investor overweights the firm as compared with the total weight of the firm's bonds in a value-weighted bond market portfolio; and the aggregate institutional ownership of the firm's bonds. Using these proxies for investor demand, we find strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that institutional investors' demand for a firm's bonds is greater if the firm's maturity variety is greater. 2 Specifically, the odds of an institutional investor holding any of a firm's bonds are approximately 12% higher if the dispersion of that firm's bonds across maturities is one standard deviation higher. The filling of one additional maturity bin by the firm increases those odds by 32%. Also, a one-standarddeviation increase in the dispersion of a firm's bonds across maturities raises the weight (the overweight) of that firm in the average institutional investor's portfolio by 3.5% (4%) over the mean, while the filling of one additional maturity bin increases the portfolio weight (overweight) by 5% (3%) over the mean. The results based on the aggregate ownership variable are similar. These results are robust to controlling for various firm and bond characteristics, including the firm's overall bonds outstanding, average maturity of the firm's outstanding bonds, and the overall holdings of the institutional investor in the specific maturity bin. 3 Also, as predicted, the affinity for greater maturity variety is strongest among larger institutional investors as well as those investors whose portfolio is less specialized in terms of maturities held.
We also conduct a similar analysis at the individual fund level. We first identify all the funds of a given institutional investor and then analyze how the demand of one fund relates to the demand of all the other funds that belong to the same institutional investor. For any given fund, we denote the other funds that belong to the same institutional investor as its "sister" funds. 4 Again, we empirically proxy for a fund's demand either using a dummy variable that indicates whether the fund holds any bonds of that firm or using the weight of the firm in the fund's portfolio. Using these two proxies for a fund's demand, we first document that an individual fund's demand for a firm's bonds is positively related to its sister funds' demand for the bonds of the same firm. Specifically, the odds of a fund holding bonds of a firm are 30% higher if the sister funds also hold bonds of that same firm. Further, the weight of a firm in a fund's portfolio is higher by 1.9% (over its mean) if the sister funds' portfolio weight in the same firm is higher by one standard deviation.
Next, we provide evidence that is suggestive of jointly coordinated behavior among the various funds managed by an institutional investor. Specifically, we trace how new inflows into individual funds are allocated to the bonds of a firm depending on the prior holdings of sister funds in the bonds of the same firm. We find that the allocation of new inflows depends on the sister funds' portfolio weight; that is, a fund allocates more of its new inflows to a firm if the sister funds' portfolio weight in that firm is large (i.e., above the sample mean). In contrast, when the sister funds' portfolio weight in a firm is small (i.e., equal to or below the sample mean), new inflows into the fund are diverted into other investments. This provides evidence of jointly coordinated behavior that is presumably information driven, but definitely not aimed at reducing the overall exposure of the investor to the specific firm. The coordinated behavior of funds is consistent with information being gathered at the headquarters level and used by multiple funds within an institutional investor.
Does greater investor demand for the bonds of high-MV firms have any impact on bond yields? We find that in the primary market, the average offering yield of a firm that is present in two out of the three maturity bins is 45 bp lower than the equivalent offering yield of a firm present only in one of the three maturity bins. Similarly, the average offering yield of a firm that spans all three maturity bins is 83 bp lower than the equivalent offering yield of a firm covering two out of three maturity bins. This holds regardless of the type of maturity bin-short-, medium-, or long-term. 5 Multivariate tests of primary market yields indicate that a firm with a onestandard-deviation higher dispersion of bonds across various maturities pays 10 bp less in the cost of the next issue, while the filling of one additional maturity bin translates into 23 fewer basis points in the cost of the next issue. Firms with greater maturity variety also command a lower yield in the secondary market. A one-standard-deviation increase in the dispersion of bonds across various maturities is related to a 32-bp lower yield in the secondary market, while the filling of one additional maturity bin translates into a 46-bp lower yield in the secondary market.
Additional (unreported) results show that when the firm is riskier-e.g., smaller in size, with smaller cash holdings, a lower Z-score, or lower asset tangibility-the positive relation between maturity variety and institutional investors'portfolio weight is stronger. 6 The favorable impact of greater maturity variety on offering yields is also more pronounced when the firm is riskier. This is consistent with the notion that the advantage of collecting information on the firm's creditworthiness is greater when the firm is riskier.
A challenge in our empirical work is that we must infer investor demand by observing equilibrium quantities instead of observing the full demand and supply schedule. Given that we rely on empirical proxies, we cannot avoid this issue altogether, but we do our best to mitigate any concerns about our interpretation of the results. First, we control for the alternative determinants of investors' bond portfolio investments. Second, we use two identifying restrictions: the government-induced "gap filling" (Greenwood et al. 2010; Badoer and James 2012) and the geography of demand for bonds. These are arguably exogenous sources of variation in the firm's choice of debt maturity that allow us to measure the effect on investors' demand without the usual confounding effects. The results for these two tests support our main findings both for investors' portfolio weights and for bond yields (in the primary as well as the secondary market). Another concern with regard to our findings may be that there are other factors that confound our interpretation of the results. We therefore discuss potential alternative explanations in Section 7 and argue that, while these alternative factors may play a role, they cannot fully explain all of our findings.
Overall, our findings suggest a link between the institutional investors' bond portfolios and the variety of bond maturities offered by firms. As such, our paper contributes to several different strands of the corporate finance literature. First, we propose a determinant of institutional investment in corporate bonds. Our paper highlights an important role of a firm's maturity variety in explaining the institutional demand for bonds. Our findings suggest that institutional investors prefer firms offering various maturities due to a more efficient information collection process. Second, we add to the evidence in the empirical asset-pricing literature on the cross-sectional determinants of yield spreads by providing evidence on an important factor that can explain yield spreads in the crosssection: the maturity variety offered by firms.
Finally, the choice of debt maturity has been mainly explained by firm characteristics (e.g., Guedes and Opler 1996) or overall market conditions, such as the term structure of interest rates (Barclay and Smith 1995) . If the firms act as providers of macro liquidity, then debt-maturity structure may also be chosen to absorb large supply shocks associated with changes in the maturity of government debt (Greenwood et al. 2010) . While these theories help to explain the average maturity/duration choice, we contribute to the literature by providing an explanation for the variety of bond maturities that firms offer.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 lays out our main testable hypotheses. Section 2 describes the sample and the main variables. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze how the demand for bonds from institutional investors and individual funds, respectively, is affected by the issuing firm's maturity variety. Section 5 relates bond yields in the primary and secondary market to the firm's maturity variety. We address endogeneity concerns in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss potential alternative interpretations of our results, and a brief conclusion follows.
Main Hypotheses and Testable Propositions
While diversification benefits dictate that portfolio managers should diversify their holdings across firms, managers instead may hold concentrated portfolios if this helps them to better exploit their informational advantage (e.g., Kacperczyk et al. 2005; Coval and Moskowitz 1999, 2001 ). In the case of bonds, better information on the firm's default probability and credit riskiness can be used for investing in bonds with different maturities as well as different covenants, collateral, or other contractual features. The potential bondinvestment strategies in which the same information can be employed are numerous. 7 These considerations suggest that a firm with a greater maturity variety is helpful for the institutional investors insofar as such a firm fulfills 7 Moreover, in the case of bonds, there are additional benefits due to a concentrated investment in fewer firmslender concentration reduces the risk of coordination failure among multiple claimants during renegotiation or default (Rajan 1992; Bolton and Scharfstein 1996; Preece and Mullineaux 1996; Berglöf and von Thadden 1994) . Concentrated ownership allows the bondholder to internalize the benefits of monitoring and thereby reduce the the investors' need for diversification across maturities while economizing on information costs. This increases both the likelihood of investment by the investor and the investor's portfolio weight in the firm. The benefits to the institutional investor from investing in multiple bonds of the same firm are due to the investor's ability to exploit the same credit information about the firm across different investment opportunities. These benefits should thus be stronger for larger institutions, which would naturally have more such opportunities than smaller investors. For example, compare a large institutional investor managing short-, medium-, and long-term bond portfolios with a small institutional investor specializing, say, only in shortterm bonds. The larger investor will be able to exploit the information acquired from examining a single firm and include the short-term bonds of this firm in its short-term portfolio, the medium-term bonds in its medium-term portfolio, and so on. Whereas the smaller investor that is focused only on short-term bonds will benefit less from the variety of maturities offered by some firms. These considerations suggest that institutional investors would prefer to concentrate their investments in firms that span the maturity spectrum as this reduces their information-collection costs. Further, this tendency would be stronger in institutional investors that are larger or less specialized in any particular maturity. This brings us to propose our first hypothesis, as follows:
H1: Institutional investors' portfolio holdings and weights of bonds are positively related to a firm's maturity variety. This relation is stronger for larger institutional investors or for institutional investors whose portfolios are less specialized in terms of maturity.
A corollary of our main prediction is that if information costs are important in bond choice, then multiple funds/portfolios of a given institutional investor should be likely to invest in different bonds of the same firm. Specifically, a fund's demand for the bonds of a firm would be higher if the "sister funds"-that is, the other funds managed by the same institutional investor-also hold bonds of the same firm. Therefore, our next hypothesis is as follows:
H2: A fund's portfolio holdings and weights of the bonds of a firm are higher if the sister funds' holdings and weights of the bonds of the same firm are also higher.
An important question that arises in this context is whether the firm's maturity variety affects bond price. If the bond market is segmented, then the preferences of even a subset of all the investors can have a significant impact on bond prices. Evidence of market segmentation is widespread and dates back to the classic "preferred habitat" hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates (Modigliani and Sutch 1966) . In another strand of the literature, recent studies such as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) , Greenwood and Vayanos (2008, 2010) , and Greenwood et al. (2010) provide evidence of a downward-sloping demand for government bonds. In this context, the price pressure by one class of investors translates into higher prices because the market cannot easily absorb the excess demand. As such, market segmentation along maturities suggests that greater demand for the bonds of high-MV firms would increase the price pressure on these bonds. This would allow high-MV firms to enjoy higher bond prices and lower yields. Therefore, our final hypothesis is as follows:
H3: Bond yields are negatively related to the maturity variety of firms.
Before moving to the tests, we describe the data and the construction of the main variables.
Data and Variables

Main sources of data
We draw our data from multiple sources. We test Hypotheses H1 and H2 using data on institutional holdings of U.S. corporate bonds over 1998Q1-2007Q2. These data are obtained from Lipper's eMAXX fixed-income database. This database contains detailed fixed-income holdings for nearly 20,000 entities that include American and European insurance firms; American, Canadian, and European mutual funds; and leading American banks as well as public pension funds. It provides information on quarterly holdings of more than 40,000 fixed-income issuers, with $5.4 trillion in total fixed-income par amount. We focus on U.S.-issued corporate bonds held by American institutions; this sample has about 1,200 institutional investors every quarter, holding a total face value of about $1.8 billion on average. For these institutions, eMAXX reports the holdings based on regulatory disclosure to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for insurance companies and to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for mutual funds, asset managers, and public pension funds; it also reports voluntary disclosures by the major private pension funds. 8 Figure 1 shows that, among the different types of institutional investors, insurance companies and mutual funds appear to be the predominant investors in corporate bonds, together accounting for about 80% of all institutional bond holdings in our sample. On the other hand, commercial banks, brokerage firms, and pension funds each hold a small fraction of the corporate bonds. On average, every firm in our sample has about seventeen institutional investors holding its bonds. 
Figure 1
Prevalence of the various types of institutional investors in our sample Figure 1 plots the percentage of total institutional bond holdings in our sample by the type of institutional investor. For example, the figure indicates that 53% of all institutional bond holdings are due to the bond holdings of insurance companies. The percentages are first calculated every quarter for the five main types of institutional investors (the residual is aggregated in the "Other" category). We then take an average of these percentages across all the quarters in our sample period 1998Q1-2007Q2. The quarterly average is presented on the vertical axis and the type of institutional investor is defined on the horizontal axis.
The eMAXX database reports bond holdings in firms both at the level of the institutional investor and at the individual fund level. "Funds" are the individual pools of assets that institutional investors manage. Institutional investors are the investment companies-for example, Fidelity or Prudential-and their holdings reflect their aggregate bond holdings across their various funds. Institutional investors can hold multiple maturities either through maturityfocused funds or through funds that invest across maturities. However, not all institutional investors are organized as a family of multiple funds; some institutional investors are organized as a single entity holding all their investments in one portfolio. In our sample, 40% of all institutional investors' bond holdings by face value are accounted for by bond holdings of distinct funds; this implies that the remaining 60% of bonds by face value are held by institutional investors that are organized as a single portfolio instead of as a family of funds. 9 In the case of mutual fund families in Lipper eMAXX, each "fund" represents an individual mutual fund. In the case of insurance companies, however, funds represent two different investment vehicles. The first are variable annuity funds, which offer an investment instrument that combines attributes of mutual fund investment and insurance. 10 The second type of insurance funds includes property/damage or life-insurance funds. These are the vehicles used by the insurance companies to invest the money set aside for future claims. The average number of funds managed by an institutional investor is four while the median is two. For each fund, we define its sister funds as all the other funds that are managed by the same institutional investor. Therefore, the above statistic implies that the average fund in our sample has three sister funds.
We test Hypothesis H3 using information on corporate bond yields that is drawn from Mergent's Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). This database provides extensive information on approximately 68,000 bond issues and includes bonds issued by U.S. government agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Yankee bonds issued by foreign entities, etc. U.S. corporate bond issues from Mergent FISD that can be matched with Lipper's eMAXX bond-holdings data result in approximately 2,500 issues. The sample is further reduced in the multivariate regressions as we require all independent variables to be nonmissing.
We merge these data with the CRSP-Compustat Merged Database. We consider all nonfinancial, nonutility firms that appear in the CRSP-Compustat Merged Database and have bonds in Lipper. We require all the variables and relevant lags thereof to be available for all observations. We use Compustat to construct the standard measures of firm characteristics: firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, cash holdings, cash flows, Z-score, and tangibility. These are defined in Section 2.4.
How representative are the Lipper data when compared with Mergent FISD-the commonly used database for U.S. corporate bonds? We find that 95% of all the Mergent FISD bond issues by face value are covered in Lipper. 11 The missing 5% is represented by bonds issued by foreign firms (e.g., Yankee bonds). For the bond-issuing firms in our sample, the bonds in Lipper represent a significant fraction of their overall debt (as reported in Compustat)-the ratio of the face value of bonds in Lipper to debt in Compustat is 58% on average. The residual generally is debt in the form of bank loans and bonds less than one year in maturity.
To further characterize the Lipper data, we pick the top fifty firms in our sample from the year 2006 as an example and examine their outstanding debt, as obtained from Compustat, Mergent, and Lipper. We find that on average, more than three-quarters of the firms' Compustat debt can be accounted for by the bond issues in Mergent. Further, close to 90% of these Mergent bonds are found in our Lipper data set. As a result, the bonds that we use in our analysis account for a significant fraction of the firm's debt reported in Compustat. We report these supplementary statistics in 
Measuring the degree of maturity variety
The independent variable of interest is the degree of firms' maturity variety (MV), which we measure using three different proxies. 13 First, using the face values of bonds, we calculate the concentration-a Herfindahl index-of a firm's bonds across its different maturities. We then define the first proxy for the firm's maturity variety (denoted MV-1) as the logarithm of the reciprocal of the above Herfindahl. We take the reciprocal so as to be consistent with the other measures-larger values of MV-1 would suggest that the firm has spanned more maturities. Given that we use the reciprocal of concentration, this variable measures the "dispersion" of bonds across maturities.
The second proxy for the firm's maturity variety (denoted MV-2) is the ratio of the number of maturities in which the firm has bonds outstanding to the total number of its bonds outstanding. So, to go back to the example in the introduction, this proxy equals 12/13 for IBM in 2007.
The third measure of the firm's maturity variety (denoted MV-3) is a discrete (cardinal) variable defined by classifying bonds into three maturity bins. Relying on the market practice-that is, guidelines of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States-we consider three main maturity bins: short term (less than 5 years), medium term (from 5 to 10 years), and long term (more than 10 years). We then count the number of maturity bins in which the firm has at least 20% of its bonds outstanding by face value. For example, if a firm has at least 20% of its bonds in two of the three potential maturity bins, then its MV-3 equals 2. A firm with at least 20% of its bonds outstanding in all three maturity bins has an MV-3 equal to 3. Summary statistics reported in Table 1 , Panel A, show that the median (average) number of maturity bins filled is 2 (1.646). 14 We obtain similar results if we relax the 20% threshold and instead define MV-3 by counting all those maturity bins where the firm has any amount of bonds outstanding. We leave these results unreported.
Other independent variables
It is important to control for the firm's total bonds outstanding because it would mechanically affect the institutional investor's demand for the firm's bonds. We define Total Bonds Outstanding as the logarithm of the face value of the firm's total bonds outstanding. We also control for the propensity of greater maturity variety among the firm's rivals; it allows us to control for substitutability in the that have bond ratings. Therefore, Lipper eMAXX reflects the bond-financing activity very well, and as such, our findings are generalizable to the broader sample of U.S. firms that have bonds outstanding. 13 The dependent variables are defined when we describe the corresponding empirical tests in later sections.
14 We also experimented with using five maturity bins (at 5-year intervals). However, given that the median and average number of maturity bins is around two, we think three is a more appropriate number of potential maturity bins. We construct it by using the corresponding MV proxy, and averaging its value every quarter across all the firms that compete for capital with the given firm. We define "rival/competing firms" as those other firms whose bond issues are closer substitutes of the bonds issued by the firm under consideration. Specifically, competing firms are the ones that are in the same credit-rating category and belong to the same industry (using the forty-eight industries given in Fama and French 1997) . The intuition is that the demand for a firm's bonds may be lower if all the other firms that are close substitutes also display greater maturity variety. Further, it may be that firms with greater maturity variety have a longer average maturity for their bonds. To make sure that MV proxies do not simply capture an average maturity effect, we control for the issuing firm's Average Bonds Maturity. We define it as a weighted average maturity of all the outstanding bonds of a firm where the weights are the respective face values of those bonds. Finally, given that the weight of a firm in an institutional investor's portfolio is mechanically smaller if the portfolio is large, we also control for an institutional investor's size (Investor's TNA). A more detailed definition of all the variables is provided in the Appendix.
Control variables
We control for a variety of firm characteristics, such as Firm Size, Leverage, Cash, Cash Flow, and Market-to-Book . Definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix and the data for constructing these variables are obtained from the CRSP-Compustat Merged Database. The goal is to control for alternative determinants of an institutional investor's portfolio weight in the firm's bonds. For example, firm size can affect an investor's portfolio weight in the firm and can also be related to the firm's maturity variety. Indeed, larger firms are more "visible" and likely to be less risky (say, because of many diverse operations with low correlations) and therefore attract more demand from institutional investors. Also, larger firms, either because of fewer financial constraints or because of greater capital needs, are more likely to have bonds of many maturities. A firm's leverage is a source of risk for institutions investing in the firm. Firms with greater leverage may end up filling more maturity bins because the rollover risk is greater when leverage is higher. A greater maturity variety will help spread the refinancing needs more equally and thus will reduce the rollover risk. In contrast, firms with more cash holdings (Cash) and greater profitability (Cash Flows) are less likely to need more debt. As a result, they suffer a lower rollover risk and thus may have bonds of fewer maturities. Also, cash increases the transparency of the firm (e.g., Gopalan et al. 2012) , thus increasing investor demand for the firm's bonds. Finally, firms with a greater market-equity-tobook-equity ratio are likely to have more growth opportunities and may finance these by issuing a variety of bonds.
A firm's riskiness should directly affect institutional investors' demand for bonds. To control for credit riskiness, we use Z-score, Tangibility ratio, and the firm's credit ratings. Z-score is based on Altman (1968) and measures the risk of bankruptcy. Tangibility ratio is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets. It measures the fixed assets that can be used as collateral. To control for the firm's credit ratings, we divide the range of all ratings (from "no rating" through "AAA-rated") into five groups. Those with no rating belong to group 0, and the rest are split into four equal groups. If the risk of rollover is higher for riskier firms and if firms spread their bonds across various maturities to overcome this rollover risk, then we expect greater maturity variety to be positively related to these measures of a firm's credit riskiness.
We also use dummy variables to control for the bond characteristics, such as whether it is a private placement or whether it has covenants attached. The dummy variables equal 1 if the bond is privately placed or has covenants, respectively; they are 0 otherwise. Dummy variables for callability and convertibility of bonds are defined similarly. These are features that affect institutional investors' bond holdings. We use these variables as dummies when the focus is at the bond level (yield regressions), while we take their valueweighted average when the focus is at the firm level (demand regressions). In the latter case, the weights are face values of the bonds. For the yield regressions, covenants and other bond characteristics are obtained from Mergent FISD; they are obtained from Lipper's eMAXX data when used in the demand regressions.
Finally, we control for the firm's banking relationship. We use a Relationship Banking dummy that equals 1 if the firm has completed a "relationship-lending" deal in the past five years and equals 0 otherwise. A relationship-lending deal is defined as such if at least one of the lead arrangers has lent to the borrower in the three years prior to the deal date. The construction of this variable follows Bharath et al. (2007) and is in line with the literature on relationship banking (e.g., Boot 2000; Boot and Thakor 2000; Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Yasuda 2005) . We construct this variable using loanorigination data from the DealScan database of the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). We posit that firms that have a close relationship with a bank are considered safer by other creditors, as these banks can step in to provide liquidity to the firms when needed.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of all the main variables (including the dependent variables, which are defined later). In Panel B of Table 1 , we report a matrix of correlations between all the independent variables described so far. In addition to the variables described above, we control for a variety of fixed effects using dummies for the following: lead underwriter of the firm's bonds, the type of institutional investor, the firm's credit ratings, time (identified by the quarter), and the firm's industry (per Fama and French 1997) . 15 Dummy variables for the firm's credit ratings and industry control for both risk and transparency and have a direct impact on the demand from institutional investors. Time (quarter) dummies are included to control for economy-wide trends, such as business cycle, overall bond-market performance, etc.
Firm's Maturity Variety and Institutional Investors' Bond Holdings
We start by analyzing the effect of the firm's maturity variety on the institutional investors' bond holdings. Because it is difficult to empirically observe the true demand schedule, we can at best use the actual portfolio allocations of the institutional investors to characterize their demand for bonds. Therefore, while our hypotheses relate to the institutional investors' demand, our tests are based 15 We include the lead-underwriter dummy to control for the possibility that it may be the underwriter's special relationship with the institutional investor that explains the investor's preference for firms that span multiple maturities. Specifically, it may be argued that if the underwriters favor their regular buy-side investors (e.g., Benveniste and Spindt 1989; Gondat-Larralde and James 2008) and the issuing firm regularly picks the same underwriter, then this may explain the relationship between the firm's maturity variety and the institutional investor's demand for bonds. When the bonds of a firm are managed by different lead underwriters, we define the lead underwriter dummies using the most frequently used lead underwriter across all the bonds of the firm in the given quarter.
on their portfolio weights in different firms. With that caveat in mind, we measure the institutional investors' demand using three different proxies; we describe these proxies next.
The overall demand of the institutional investors
We start by pictorially presenting the main message of this paper. In Figure 2 , we plot the quarterly time series of the aggregate institutional bond ownership in high-and low-MV firms. First, for each firm in every quarter, we sum the bond holdings of all the institutional investors in our database and then calculate the aggregate institutional bond ownership as a percentage of the firm's total bonds outstanding. Next, we classify all firms every quarter along two dimensions: maturity variety and ratings. Specifically, we group firms into "high-MV" or "low-MV" and "high-rated" or "low-rated." 16 We then average the aggregate institutional bond ownership (as a percentage of the firm's bonds outstanding) every quarter across all the firms within the same MV-rating group and plot the average separately for each MV-rating group. These are represented by the four lines and measured on the left vertical axis. We also plot the difference between the high-MV and low-MV lines; it is presented as a bar chart (measured against the right vertical axis). We do this separately for the high-rated and low-rated groups so as to control for the effect of credit ratings. The figure shows that the aggregate institutional bond ownership (as a percentage of the firm's bonds outstanding) is higher for high-MV firms than for low-MV firms. This holds true within the subsamples of both high-rated and low-rated firms. Overall, the figure supports our main intuition that investors tend to invest more in firms that offer more maturities.
To statistically test whether there is a relation between an institutional investor's portfolio weight in the bonds of the firm and the firm's maturity variety, we estimate
(1)
The dependent variable θ i,j,t refers to institutional investor i's portfolio weight in the bonds of firm j in quarter t. This is used as a proxy for the demand of investor i for the bonds of firm j . Note that if the institutional investor i is organized as a family of funds, then its bond holdings are the aggregate holdings of its individual funds. The proxies for the institutional investor's demand include a dummy variable as well as three different measures based on the investor's actual portfolio weight in the firm's bonds. The dummy variable (Investor's Portfolio-Weight Dummy) indicates whether the portfolio weight of 16 We sort firms on credit ratings as well because firms' ratings are one of the most important determinants of investors' bond holdings. For the purpose of this figure, we classify firms as "high-MV" if their MV-3 value is greater than one and as "low-MV" if their MV-3 equals one. We classify firms into the "low-rated" group if their credit rating is "CCC" or above but below "BBB" and into the "high-rated" group if their credit rating is "A" or above.
- 5%  0%  5%  10%  15%  20%  25%  30%  35%  40%  45%   0%  5%  10%  15%  20%  25%  30%  35%  40%  45% Aggregate institutional bond ownership as a function of firms' maturity variety Figure 2 plots the quarterly time series of the aggregate institutional ownership of corporate bonds averaged across firms. Specifically, for each firm and every quarter in our sample period 1998Q1-2007Q2, we first aggregate the bond holdings of all the institutional investors (including mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, banks, and brokerages) in our database.
We then calculate the aggregate institutional ownership as a percentage of the firm's total bonds outstanding. Every quarter, we classify firms into high/low groups of credit ratings and MV, and then average the aggregate institutional ownership across all the firms that belong to the same ratings-MV group. We represent these quarterly averages by separate lines for each ratings-MV group (measured on the left vertical axis). For the purpose of this graph, firms are classified as "low rated" if their S&P credit rating is "CCC" or above but below "BBB" and they are considered "high rated" if the rating is "A" or above. The classification into "low MV" and "high MV" is based on the firms' value for MV-3. "Low MV" firms' MV-3 equals one (i.e., these firms have at least 20% of their bonds outstanding in one of the three maturity bins-short, medium, or long term) and "high MV" firms' MV-3 is either equal to two or three (i.e., at least 20% of their bonds are outstanding in multiple maturity bins). The difference between the high-MV and low-MV lines (measured on the right vertical axis) is plotted as a bar chart; we plot this separately for low-rated and high-rated firms.
investor i in the bonds of firm j in quarter t is positive or zero (i.e., whether investor i holds any bonds of firm j in quarter t). (1) is the degree of firm j 's maturity variety in quarter t; it is measured by the three alternative proxies defined in Section 2.2 above. CONTROLS i,j,t refers to the vector of investor-specific and firm-specific control variables that are included in the regressions. It includes Total Bonds Outstanding, Average Bonds Maturity, Competitors' Avg. MV, and Investor's TNA, which have been defined in Section 2.3 above. We also include firmand bond-specific control variables that are defined in Section 2.4 above. Definitions of all the variables are provided in the Appendix. We also include five sets of dummy variables (described above in Section 2.4). When we use the dummy dependent variable, we estimate the coefficients using a logistic regression model. Otherwise, we estimate a pooled OLS regression with the aforementioned fixed effects. The errors are clustered at the institutional investor level. We report the results across the various panels of Table 2 .
In Panel A of Table 2 , we start with a univariate regression estimate of Equation (1), where the only independent variable is MV. We find a strongly positive relationship between all three proxies of MV and the three different dependent variables. This suggests that not only are investors more likely to hold bonds of high-MV firms, but they are also likely to put a greater portfolio weight in the bonds of these firms (as measured both by the actual weight and the overweight in comparison to the market weight). All the estimated coefficients in Panel A are significant at the 1% level, thus offering preliminary evidence in support of our Hypothesis H1 that investors' holdings and weights in a firm's bonds are higher for firms with more variety in their maturity structure.
Next, in Panel B of Table 2 , we consider a multivariate regression in which the only explanatory variables are MV j,t (which is the variable of interest) and the most important control variables: Total Bonds Outstanding and dummies for the firm's credit ratings. Again, we estimate this regression with three different proxies of MV and three different dependent variables. The results show that the bond holdings of institutional investors are strongly positively related to the firm's MV. These coefficients are mostly significant at the 1% level and confirm that the greater the maturity variety of a firm, the higher the investor's portfolio weight in the firm's bonds.
In Panels C-E of Table 2 , we enhance these simple regressions by including an array of control variables. The dependent variables in Panels C and Table 2 Institutional investors' portfolio weight in the firm and the firm's maturity variety 
(8)
MV-1 
The dependent variable is a proxy for the institutional investor's demand. It is measured by investor which is a dummy variable indicating whether an institutional investor's portfolio weight in the firm in a given quarter is zero or positive. In Columns 4-6, it is Investor's Portfolio Weight, which is the percentage of an institutional investor's portfolio invested in a firm's bonds in a given quarter; it is defined only when the investor's bond holdings are positive. Finally, in Columns 7-9, it is Investor's Overweighting, which measures the difference between the weight of the firm in the investor's portfolio and the firm's "market" weight in a value-weighted portfolio consisting of all the bonds in the same ratings category as firm j ; it is also defined only when the investor's bond holdings are positive. In Panel B, we add two important control variables beside MV: the face value of bonds outstanding and the credit ratings of the bonds. Panels C-E present results from multivariate regressions that include other independent variables beside MV, such as several firmand bond-specific control variables. Also included are dummy variables for the firm's credit ratings, the bond's lead underwriter, investor type, quarter, and the firm's industry. While these control variables substantially improve the explanatory power of the regression model, the coefficients on MV proxies in both Panels C and D are positive and still strongly significant (at least at the 5% level). Importantly, in line with our working hypothesis, the results are robust to the inclusion of the firm's total bonds outstanding and the average maturity of the firm's bonds. This suggests that our MV proxies do not just capture the excess supply of the given firm's bonds or an average-maturity effect.
The remaining Columns 4-6 of Panels C and D present results estimated using all the remaining firm-and bond-specific control variables that could potentially influence the investor's portfolio allocation. 17 The results from these full-fledged specifications are similar. The coefficients on all three MV proxies are statistically significant at the 1% level and are economically large. In the case of MV-1, a one-standard-deviation increase in the dispersion of bonds across maturities increases the odds of investment by an average institutional investor in the firm by 12% and the actual portfolio weight by 3.5% over the unconditional mean. Similarly, in the case of MV-3, the filling of one additional maturity bin increases the odds by 32% and institutional investor's portfolio weight by 5% over the unconditional mean. In Panel E of Table 2 , we use the dependent variable Investor's Overweighting to estimate coefficients for Equation (1). Although these results are statistically somewhat weaker, they are economically strong-for example, a one-standard-deviation increase in the dispersion of a firm's bonds across various maturities (MV-1) increases the investor's overweighting by 4% over the mean and the filling of one additional maturity bin (MV-3) increases the overweighting by 3% over the mean. Overall, these results support our claim that investors overweight high-MV firms.
Conditioning on investor size
We now focus on how the characteristics of the institutional investors affect their bond portfolios. We expect the relation between the institutional investor's portfolio weight in the firm's bonds and the firm's maturity variety to be stronger when the investor is more capable of exploiting the credit information across investments in different maturities. As we argued above, this ability should improve with the investor's size. We measure the size of the institutional investor by the face value of all its bond holdings, expressed as a logarithm. We categorize the investors as small, medium, and large if their total assets are in the bottom, middle, and top tercile, respectively, in that quarter. We then interact the MV proxies with three dummy variables corresponding to these categories of investor size.
The results using the dependent variables Investor's Portfolio-Weight Dummy, Investor's Portfolio Weight, and Investor's Overweighting are presented in PanelsA-C, respectively, of Table 3 . The estimated results using all three proxies of MV show that the impact of maturity variety is concentrated in the large-sized investors. Throughout the three panels, the estimated coefficient on all the MV proxies is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level when the investor is large. These results are also economically large-as shown by the coefficients in Column 2 of Panels A and B, a one-standard-deviation increase in the firm's MV-1 is related with 28% higher odds that a large institution holds bonds of the firm and a 13% higher portfolio weight (over the unconditional mean) of a large institution in the firm, respectively. Similarly, in Column 6 of Panels A and B, a unit increase in the firm's MV-3 is related with 21% higher odds that a large institution holds bonds of the firm and a 30% higher portfolio weight (over the unconditional mean) of a large institution in the firm, respectively. The investments of small-and medium-sized institutions are either unaffected or are lower, and the difference between small and large institutions is statistically significant. The results using Investor's Overweighting in Panel C are similarly strong.
This result also allows us to rule out the spurious correlation between greater investor demand for a firm's bonds and the fact that the firm may have more bonds outstanding than other similar firms. Indeed, if that were the case, the estimates would have the opposite sign and would be stronger for small institutions, as the portfolio weight of small institutions would be more easily affected (than that of large institutions) by a larger supply of bonds. Overall, these results support our hypothesis that investors will have larger holdings and weights in bonds of firms with more variety in the maturity structure of their bonds, and that this is particularly true for larger investors.
Degree of investor specialization
Another way of distinguishing between the different types of institutional investors is to classify them by the extent of their specialization in fewer maturities. Specifically, if the institutional investor is predisposed to concentrate its bond holdings in fewer maturity bins, then its demand is less likely to respond to the firm's maturity variety. On the other hand, an institutional investor whose holdings are more spread out across the various maturities should have a stronger preference for high-MV firms. -1) , the ratio of all the different maturities of the firm's outstanding bonds to the number of different bonds that are currently outstanding (denoted by MV-2), and a discrete variable that counts the number of maturity bins in which the firm has 20% of its outstanding bonds (denoted by MV-3); these are indicated at the top of the respective pairs of columns. We also control for several firm-specific and bondspecific variables, but for brevity, we report coefficients only on the main variables. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. z-/t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the investor level are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We test this in Table 4 by interacting the MV proxies with two complementary dummy variables for investor specialization-Investor Specialization is LOW and Investor Specialization is HIGH. The former equals 1 if the investor's holdings are more spread out across the three maturity bins (short-, medium-, and long-term) while the latter is the complementary dummy variable that equals 1 if the investor's holdings are more concentrated in fewer maturity bins. A detailed description of these variables is provided in the caption of Table 4 . The results across Panels A-C (using the same three proxies for investor demand as above) show that the positive relation between the firm's maturity variety and the institutional investor's portfolio weight is mainly present in the subsample of investors that tend to diversify their holdings across various maturities. These findings provide further evidence in favor of our hypotheses. Table 2 . Specifically, if the investor tends to "specialize" in some maturity bins, then a firm's greater maturity variety (MV) will not affect the investor's portfolio weight in the firm. On the other hand, if the investor's bond portfolio is spread out across many maturities, then the investor's preference for high-MV firms would be stronger. To test this, we first define a variable called Degree of Investor Specialization, which is the absolute deviation of the institutional investor's aggregate holdings in the given industry-quarter from equally distributed holdings across the short-/medium-/long-term maturity bins. (These maturity bins are defined as they are in the definition of MV-3.) Based on this, we define two complementary dummy variables: Investor Specialization is High, which equals 1 if the above-defined absolute deviation is above its 50th percentile, and Investor Specialization is Low, which equals 1 if the above-defined absolute deviation is below its 25th percentile. The test is based on interacting these two dummy variables with MV. The coefficients are estimated from a regression equation similar to Equation (1) shown in -1) , the ratio of all the different maturities of the firm's outstanding bonds to the number of different bonds that are currently outstanding (denoted by MV-2), and a discrete variable that counts the number of maturity bins in which the firm has 20% of its outstanding bonds (denoted by MV-3). These are indicated at the top of the respective pairs of columns. We also control for several firm-specific and bond-specific variables, but for brevity, we report coefficients only on the main variables. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. z-/t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the investor level are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Some robustness checks
We conduct a variety of additional robustness checks to bolster the above findings. For brevity, we report these supplementary results in an Internet Appendix accompanying the paper. We first test whether the effect of a firm's maturity variety on the investor's portfolio weight in the firm is stronger when the firm is more risky. The relation between a firm's maturity variety and the investor's holdings or weights of bonds should be stronger in the case of riskier firms because the benefit of information about the credit worthiness of riskier firms would be greater for the investor. We measure riskiness by Firm Size, Cash, Z-score, and Tangibility, and we classify the firms as more (less) risky if the above characteristic is below (above) the sample median. Using the dependent variables Investor's Portfolio Weight and Investor's Overweighting, we find that an institutional investor's portfolio weight in high-MV firms is especially large when the firms are riskier. As reported in Table A -3 of the Internet Appendix, these results generally hold across the three MV proxies and the four measures of a firm's riskiness. Second, we study the impact of the firms' maturity variety on investors' portfolios by classifying the investors into different types. While in all the tests reported in Table 2 we control for the fixed effects of these investor types using the investor-type dummies, here we explicitly analyze their portfolios separately. We consider banks, brokers, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds. Again, we use Investor's Portfolio Weight as well as Investor's Overweighting as the dependent variables and utilize all three proxies of MV. The results in Table A -4 of the Internet Appendix show that the impact is concentrated in insurance companies. The portfolio weights of pension funds, mutual funds, and banks are positively affected by the firms' maturity variety, although the effect is generally not statistically significant. Brokerages are the only investor type whose portfolio weights do not increase with any MV proxy; in fact, the coefficient is negative in all specifications.
Next, we study whether the presence of a loan from a bank affiliated with the institutional investor alters that investor's appetite for the firm's bonds. We expect the impact of maturity variety to be weaker when the investor has a concurrent bank-lending relationship with that firm. That is, an investor with an outstanding credit exposure to a firm via a bank loan would be reluctant to further increase it by overinvesting in the bonds of that same firm. We define a bank loan as existing if it was originated in the two years before the quarter under observation and it has a maturity that is longer than two years-that is, the loan is still active in the current quarter. 18 As shown in Table A -5 of the Internet Appendix, the results using dependent variables Investor's Portfolio Weight and Investor's Overweighting support our working hypothesis. Using all three MV proxies, we find that the positive relation between the firm's maturity variety and the investor's portfolio weight in the bonds of a firm is present only when the investor does not have a bank-lending relationship with the firm.
Finally, we check for the robustness of our main results on investor demand by using the dependent variable Institutional Bond Ownership, which is defined as the aggregate institutional ownership of the firm's bonds (calculated as a percentage of the firm's bonds outstanding). Therefore, the sample is now at firm-quarter level instead of investor-firm-quarter level. This formulation of investors' ownership directly accounts for the supply of bonds by the firm. Although we have controlled for the Total Bonds Outstanding in all the previous tests discussed so far, this particular test specification explicitly rules out the possibility that the results are spuriously driven by a greater supply of bonds by the firm. The results, shown in Table A-6 of the Internet Appendix, are consistent with those reported above-the estimated coefficient on the various MV proxies is positive and generally significant. Further, we find that the positive relationship between the aggregate institutional ownership and the firm's MV is stronger in the case of riskier firms. This is also consistent with our other findings discussed above.
Overall, the results from these robustness tests are consistent with our hypothesis. They document a statistically strong and economically significant relationship between a firm's maturity variety in its bonds and an institutional investor's portfolio holdings and weights.
Evidence at the Individual Fund Level
We now focus on individual funds within an institutional investor. We have argued that the institutional investors will prefer high-MV firms if it helps their information gathering process, such as being able to use information about a firm's credit quality across different funds that they manage. As we propose in Hypothesis H2, this sharing of information across funds implies that the holdings and weights of a firm's bonds by an individual fund will be positively related to its sister funds' holdings and weights of the same firm. Thus, we expect funds managed by the same institutional investor to tend to coordinate their investment decisions by holding bonds of the same firm. We estimate the following model to test for this coordinated behavior across funds of the same institutional investor:
The dependent variable θ f,j,t refers to fund f 's portfolio weight in the bonds of firm j in quarter t. We first define θ f,j,t using bonds of all maturities. We use both the actual portfolio weight and a dummy variable based on it. 19 The dummy dependent variable (denoted Fund's Portfolio-Weight Dummy) indicates whether fund f holds any bonds of firm j in quarter t. The second dependent variable (denoted Fund's Portfolio Weight) is calculated as the ratio of the investment by fund f in all the bonds of firm j to all the bonds in the same rating category (as firm j ) that fund f holds in its portfolio in quarter t. Since individual bond funds are often focused on a specific maturity, we also analyze the funds' investments by each maturity bin. In this case, the above two dependent variables are defined using only short-, medium-, or long-term bonds.
The independent variable θ −f,j,t in Equation (2) is defined like the dependent variable θ f,j,t , except that it represents the portfolio weight in firm j 's bonds by the sister funds (denoted "-f ") of fund f . θ −f,j,t is defined either by using bonds of all maturities that are held by the sister funds or, in the case of a maturity-specific dependent variable, by using sister funds' holdings of other maturities. When the dependent variable in Equation (2) is defined as a dummy, then θ −f,j,t is also constructed as a dummy variable; it equals 1 if the sister funds hold any bonds of the same firm. We include the control variables used in Equation (1), with the exception that Investor's TNA is now replaced with the Fund's TNA. We also include dummy variables for a fund's class, a firm's ratings, industry, and time (quarter).
We estimate Equation (2) as a logistic regression when using Fund's Portfolio-Weight Dummy as the dependent variable and as a pooled OLS regression when using Fund's Portfolio Weight as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 5 , Panels A and B, respectively. In Column 1, we use bonds of all maturities when defining θ f,j,t as well as θ −f,j,t . In the subsequent three columns, we focus on one maturity bin at a time to define the dependent variable θ f,j,t -using short-term bonds in Column 2, medium-term bonds in Column 3, and long-term bonds in Column 4. Correspondingly, the independent variable θ −f,j,t is defined using the sister funds' portfolio weight in bonds of other maturities but issued by the same firm-that is, medium-and long-term bonds (Column 2), or short-and long-term bonds (Column 3), and so forth.
The results in both Panels A and B of Table 5 support our Hypothesis H2 that a fund's portfolio weight in a firm's bonds is positively related to the sister funds' investments in the bonds of the same firm. These results are not only statistically significant at the 1% level but also economically meaningful. Results from Panel A suggest that the odds of a fund holding bonds of a firm are higher by about 30% if the sister funds also hold bonds of that same firm. The results from Panel B suggest that a fund f 's portfolio weight in firm j is higher by 1.9% (over the mean) if the sister funds' portfolio weight in the same firm is one standard deviation higher.
Following the robustness checks discussed in Section 3.4, we reestimate Equation (2) by conditioning on the firm's riskiness. Specifically, we test whether the effects of a firm's riskiness on demand found at the institutional investor level are also present at the fund level. For brevity, we only use the dependent variable that is constructed using bonds of all maturities. The measures of firms' riskiness are the same as those used earlier. These results (reported in Table A-7 of the Internet Appendix) support the earlier findings: the positive relation between a fund's portfolio weight and its sister funds' portfolio weights in the same firm is stronger when that firm is riskier. This is consistent with our argument that the advantage of collecting and exploiting 
The dependent variable is a proxy for an individual fund's demand. Table 2 , except that they are based on the individual fund's portfolio. The independent variable of interest is θ −f,j,t , which measures the "sister" funds' portfolio weight in the same firm j and quarter t. Sister funds are other funds managed by the same institutional investor as fund f . In the columns denoted by "All bonds," θ f,j,t and θ −f,j,t are defined using bonds of all maturities. In the columns denoted "ST (MT or LT) bonds," θf,j,t , is defined using bonds only of short-term (medium-term or long-term) maturity while θ −f,j,t is defined using bonds of other maturities (i.e., medium-and long-term in Column 2, long-and short-term in Column 3, etc.) These maturity bins are defined as they are in the definition of MV-3. We also control for several firm-specific and bond-specific variables, but for brevity, we report coefficients only on the main variables. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. z-/t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the fund level are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
information across various funds is greater if the firm is judged to be riskier. Overall, these results provide evidence of coordination among funds of an institutional investor when the benefit from collecting information is greater. To further investigate the relationship between the portfolios of funds managed by the same institutional investor, we next focus on the allocation of new inflows. Specifically, we test whether, subsequent to new fund inflows, fund f 's allocation to firm j in quarter t is different if the sister funds' portfolio weight in firm j in quarter t −1 is larger. We argue that if the sister funds' portfolio weight in firm j is indeed larger, then the new inflows into fund f would also be invested in firm j ; otherwise, the new inflows will be used for other investments. The dependent variable in this test is Change in Fund's Portfolio Weight, which is the change over (t −1,t) in the portfolio weight of fund f in firm j . The independent variable of interest is the interaction between the previous quarter's Fund Flows into fund f and a dummy variable indicating whether the sister funds'portfolio weight in firm j is large. We provide a detailed description of these variables in the caption of Table 6 .
The results, presented in Table 6 , confirm our prediction: when the sister funds' portfolio weight in a firm is large, the new inflows into fund f seem to be invested in the same firm. In contrast, when the sister funds' portfolio weight in a firm is small, then new inflows into fund f seem to be invested in other firms. Therefore, as fund f grows with inflows, this diversion into other firms effectively reduces fund f 's stake in those firms that do not have large investments from the sister funds.
Overall, the evidence in Tables 5 and 6 supports our hypothesis of a coordinated behavior across funds of a family, and this coordination is likely motivated by the institutional investor's ability to exploit the collected information across its different funds. The benefits to an institutional investor from information outweigh the cost of concentrating in fewer firms, especially when the firm is riskier.
Maturity Variety and Bond Yields
We now examine the impact on bond yields due to institutional investors' greater holdings and weights of bonds of high-MV firms. We first analyze the relationship between bond yields and the degree of the firm's maturity variety. We consider both the initial bond offering (primary market) and the secondary bond market. We estimate
where Y j,b,t is the yield at time ton bond b issued by firm j and TY t is the yield on a Treasury bond of similar maturity. In an alternative specification, we also replace the yield on the left-hand side with a yield spread. The issue-specific data on yields, time-to-maturity, and convertibility are from Mergent FISD. The data on constant-maturity Treasury interest rates are from the FRED database This table shows how new fund flows affect the relationship between a fund's portfolio weights and its sister funds' portfolio weights in the same firm. "Funds" and "sister funds" are defined in the same manner as in Table  5 . Specifically, a fund refers to individual funds managed by an institutional investor and, for any given fund, sister funds are the other funds managed by the same institutional investor. The regression equation is similar to Equation (2) shown in Table 5 ). In the column marked "All bonds," it is calculated using bonds of all maturities, and in the remaining columns, it is calculated using bonds of the specific maturity denoting that column. (These ST/MT/LT bonds are classified as in Table 5 .) The independent variables of interest are the interactions between the previous quarter's Fund Flows and the sister funds' portfolio weights in the same firm and quarter. The dummy variable Sister Funds ' Portfolio Weight (in Other Maturities) is Large is equal to 1 if the sister funds' portfolio weight (in other maturities) is greater than the mean; it is 0 otherwise. Sister Funds ' Portfolio Weight (in Other Maturities) is Small is a complementary dummy variable that equals 1 when the sister funds' portfolio weight (in other maturities) is smaller than the mean, and it is 0 otherwise. We also control for several firm-specific and bond-specific variables. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the fund level are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
of the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis. The data on secondary market yields are from Bloomberg. As before, MV j,t in Equation (3) is the maturity variety of firm j in quarter t. The control variables in (3) for firm j and bond b are defined as before in Equations (1) and (2), except that we now also include Issue Size, which is the size of the bond offering. Given that the analysis is done at the bond level, the bond-specific characteristics (such as maturity, convertibility, and existence of covenants, etc.) are now defined at the bond level instead of being averaged across all the bonds of the firm (as was done in Equations (1) and (2)). 
The dependent variable Y j,b,t is Bond's Offer Yield, which is the percentage yield on bond b issued by firm j at time t. The independent variable of interest is the firm's maturity variety, which is again proxied by three different variables: the inverse of the Herfindahl measure of the firm's bonds calculated by maturity (denoted by MV-1), the ratio of all the different maturities of the firm's outstanding bonds to the number of different bonds that are currently outstanding (denoted by MV-2), and a discrete variable that counts the number of maturity bins in which the firm has 20% of its outstanding bonds (denoted by MV-3). These are indicated at the top of the respective pairs of columns. TY t is the contemporaneous yield on a Treasury bond of similar maturity. We also control for several firm-specific and bond-specific variables, but for brevity, we report coefficients only on the main variables. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
When estimating the secondary-market yield regressions, we also control for the liquidity of the outstanding bonds, as higher liquidity will be directly related to lower yields. We calculate the bond liquidity as the logarithm of the average monthly trading volume using data from TRACE. Detailed definitions of the main variables are provided in the Appendix. We estimate a pooled OLS regression with lead underwriter, time (quarter), firm ratings, and industry fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the firm level. We expect the yield to be negatively related to the firm's MV. The results are reported in Tables 7 and  8 for the primary and secondary markets, respectively. This table shows the relation of a firm's maturity variety (MV) with the secondary-market yields of its existing bonds. The reported coefficients are estimated from a regression equation similar to Equation (3) shown in Table  7 . The dependent variable is Current Bond Yield, which is the monthly average of the percentage yield on the bonds of firm j calculated in the current quarter t. The independent variable of interest is the firm's maturity variety, which is proxied by three different variables: the inverse of the Herfindahl measure of the firm's bonds calculated by maturity (denoted by MV-1), the ratio of all the different maturities of the firm's outstanding bonds to the number of different bonds that are currently outstanding (denoted by MV-2), and a discrete variable that counts the number of maturity-bins in which the firm has 20% of its outstanding bonds (denoted by MV-3). These are indicated at the top of the respective pairs of columns. We also control for the liquidity of the outstanding bonds (Bonds Liquidity) as well as several other firm-specific and bond-specific variables, but for brevity, we report coefficients only on the main variables. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. t-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The effect of maturity variety in the primary market
We start with a simple analysis of the primary-market yields. The dependent variable Bond's Offer Yield is the percentage yield on the firm's bond and the independent variable is a proxy for the firm's maturity variety. We also control for the Treasury bond rates as well as the firm's credit ratings. These results are reported in the odd-numbered columns of Table 7 . They show that a higher maturity variety is related with a lower offering yield. Next, we include the control variables from Equation (3). We find that the negative relation between the maturity variety and primary-market yields continues to hold in the even-numbered columns of Table 7 . The results are not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. In the case of MV-1, a one-standard-deviation increase in the dispersion of bonds across maturities is related with a 10-bp lower primary yield. For MV-3, filling an additional maturity bin reduces the offering yield of new bonds by 23 bp. As a robustness check, we repeat the tests shown in Table 7 using the dependent variable Bond's Offer Spread, which is the bond's primary yield spread over a Treasury bond that is closest in maturity. The results in Panel A, Table A-8, of the Internet Appendix are practically identical to those in Table 7 .
As we have mentioned above, the positive relation between a firm's maturity variety and the institutional investors' as well as funds' demand for bonds is stronger for riskier firms. Therefore, as a corollary, we also expect the negative relation between a firm's maturity variety and the offering yields to be stronger for riskier firms. In order to test this, we interact the firm's maturity variety with measures of the firm's riskiness. We use the same four measures of firm riskiness as described in Section 3.4 earlier; these are based on firm size, cash holdings, Z-score, and tangibility ratio.
We find that the negative relation between Bond's Offer Yield and the firm's maturity variety is present only when the firm is riskier. The negative effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in MV-1 of riskier firms ranges between 15 and 21 bp, but this effect is absent in the case of relatively safer firms. Similarly, the effect of filling an additional maturity bin (MV-3) ranges between 18 and 27 bp for the riskier subsample but is not different from zero for the remaining subsample. These results-reported in Panel B, Table A-8, of the Internet Appendix-reinforce the earlier claim that the institutional investors' comparative advantage lies in collecting information on riskier firms.
The effect of maturity variety in the secondary market
We now look at the yields in the secondary market and report the results in Table 8 . The dependent variable Current Bond Yield is the percentage yield on the issuing firm's bonds in secondary-market trading. We start with a simple specification, focusing on the firm's maturity variety as the only independent variable besides controlling for the firm's credit ratings. We then add all the other independent variables and estimate the full specification. The results are consistent with those found for the primary market; that is, firms that offer a greater variety of maturities have lower yields in the secondary market.
The results hold across the different specifications using all three MV proxies. After controlling for the bond's liquidity and firm-and bond-specific characteristics as well as industry, time, and ratings fixed effects, we find that a standard-deviation increase in the dispersion of bonds across maturities (MV-1) is related to a 32-bp lower secondary-market yield, and the filling of an additional maturity bin (MV-3) reduces the secondary-market yield by 46 bp.
We also find that these results are robust to using option-adjusted spreads (OAS) instead of secondary-market yields as the dependent variable. OAS is the spread over the Treasury yield that is required to discount the bond payments such that they match the market price. The results based on OAS as the dependent variable are economically and statistically similar to those reported in Table 8 ; we report these results in Table A-9 of the Internet Appendix.
Addressing Endogeneity
A challenge in our empirical work is that we infer institutional investors' demand by observing equilibrium quantities. Given the data limitations, one cannot avoid this endogeneity altogether. However, we do our best to mitigate it using two plausibly exogenous restrictions: the government-induced "gap filling" (e.g., Greenwood et al. 2010; Badoer and James 2012) and the geographic distribution of bond holdings.
We first focus on an exogenous determinant of the firms' gap filling, which is the firms' tendency to issue bonds in the maturity gaps left by the government's bond-maturity choices. For example, if the government has issued longand medium-term bonds, then the firms will collectively issue short-term bonds. Such gap-filling behavior will not only affect the average maturity of firms' bonds but also influence their maturity variety. This rationale for firms enhancing their maturity variety is independent of the credit-qualitybased explanations and, therefore, provides a clean identifying restriction to study investors' portfolios.
We capture the degree of a firm's gap filling by projecting the changes in the firm's maturity variety on the changes in the government's bondmaturity structure. This should be an exogenously induced change in the firm's maturity variety. We then investigate how the institutional investors react to this exogenous change in the firms' maturity variety. More specifically, we estimate an instrumental-variable specification that regresses the change in the institutional investor's portfolio weight in the firm on the change in the firm's maturity variety, as predicted by the government's bond-issuance policy.
In a recent paper, Badoer and James (2012) argue that gap filling is mainly evident at the long-term end of the maturity spectrum. Therefore, we also estimate our instrumental-variable regression by focusing only on long-term bonds. Using only long-term bonds, we define the dependent variable as the change in an institutional investor's portfolio weight in the firm and instrument the change in the firm's maturity variety with a change in the government's long-term debt. This allows us to test whether the investor's weight in a firm's long-term bonds is positively affected by an increase in MV that is unrelated to the issuance of long-term bonds by the firm. Because we only use one instrument in this specification, it is an exactly identified instrumental-variable regression, and as such, we cannot estimate the Hansen's J statistic. We also repeat this exercise for bond yields using changes in the firms' secondary-market bond yields as the dependent variable, first using all the bonds and then only using long-term bonds. These instrumentalvariable regressions also include the corresponding set of control variables described in Equation (1) for investor demand and Equation (3) for bond yields.
The results are reported in Table 9 . In Panel A, we report the results for changes in the institutional investor's portfolio weight and in Panel B, we show the results for changes in secondary-market yields; results using the secondary-market spreads are similar and left unreported. The results show that an exogenously induced increase in the firm's maturity variety raises the institutional investor's portfolio weight and reduces bond yields (as well as spreads). The economic significance of the estimated effects is also large. An increase of one standard deviation (exogenously induced) in the firm's dispersion across various maturities (MV-1) is related to an 11% increase in the institutional investor's portfolio weight and an 84-bp reduction in secondary-market yields. These results suggest that institutional investors react positively to an exogenous increase in the firm's maturity variety, and this further translates into the lowering of current yields. As shown in Table A-10 of the Internet Appendix, our results also hold using secondary-market spreads instead of yields.
Our second approach to addressing the endogeneity is based on a crosssectional restriction, in contrast to the time-series variation used above. Here, we focus on the effect of the institutional investor's holdings and weights on the primary-market yield of new bond issues. Given that the bond-demand proxies used above cannot be constructed at the time of bond issuance, we must rely on the potential demand for these new issues. It is the cross-sectional variation in this potential demand that we use for our test.
Because the relation between the firm's maturity variety and the investor's portfolio weight in the firm is found to be stronger for larger institutional investors, the effect of the firm's maturity variety on primary yields is also likely to be stronger when the potential demand from larger investors is greater. We proxy for the potential demand from institutional investors using the investment capital available within the firm's vicinity (defined as a radius of 250 miles). It has been shown that institutional investors tend to prefer securities of firms located in their vicinity (Coval and Moskowitz 1999, 2001) . We therefore interact all three proxies of the firm's maturity variety with the investment capital available from small/medium/large investors that are located in the firm's vicinity. 20 The results using the dependent variable Bond's Offer Yield are reported in Panel C of Table 9 . They support our earlier findings-specifically, the negative effect of the firm's maturity variety on the primary-market bond yields exists only in the presence of greater potential demand from large investors. The effect is nonexistent for small and medium institutions. These results corroborate the fact that the larger institutions tend to respond to the firm's maturity variety, and their enhanced demand leads to lower primary yields. Panel A shows the relation between a plausibly exogenous change in the firm's maturity variety (MV) and the change in an institutional investor's portfolio weight. The instrumental-variable regression is based on Equation (1) shown in Table 2 , except we now measure the changes in the dependent variable as well as in the main independent variable. Specifically, the dependent variable is the quarterly change in Investor's Portfolio Weight (as defined in Table 2 ). The independent variable of interest is the change in the firm's maturity variety (calculated using the inverse of the Herfindahl measure of the firm's bonds calculated by maturity and denoted by MV-1). We instrument MV-1 using the change in the maturity structure of the Treasury bonds. While in Columns 1-3 we use bonds of all maturities, in Column 4 we only use long-term bonds to define the dependent variable and the instrument; this is done in light of the findings of Badoer and James (2012) , who show that the gap-filling behavior is most evident at the long end of the maturity spectrum. Column 4 helps show that an increase in MV-1 due to gap-filling by the firm in short-or medium-term can also result in investor's tilting their long-term portfolio toward this firm. We also include several firm-specific and bond-specific control variables, but for brevity, we report coefficients only on the main variables. We construct the instrumental variables for the first stage using data on Treasury bonds obtained from the FRED database of the St. Louis Federal Reserve. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. t-/z-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the investor level are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A Discussion of the Results and Alternative Explanations
Overall, our results provide evidence suggesting that institutional investors both are more likely to hold and hold more of the bonds of high-MV firms. Our interpretation is that this is due to the efficiency in information collection by the institutional investor. However, there can be alternative hypotheses that may provide similar results. We consider them next. Panel B shows the relation between an exogenous change in the firm's maturity variety (MV)-as described in Panel A above-and the change in the firm's secondary-market bond yields. The instrumental-variable regression is based on Equation (3) shown in Table 7 except that we now measure the changes in the dependent variable as well as in the main independent variable. Specifically, the dependent variable is the change in Current Bond Yield (as defined in Table 8 ). The independent variable of interest is the change in the firm's maturity variety (calculated using the inverse of the Herfindahl measure of the firm's bonds calculated by maturity and denoted by MV-1).
We instrument MV-1 using the change in the maturity structure of the Treasury bonds (as shown in Panel A).
As in Panel A, we use bonds of all maturities in Columns 1-3, but we only use long-term bonds in Column 4 to define the dependent variable and the instrument; this is done in light of the findings of Badoer and James (2012) , who show that the gap-filling behavior is most evident at the long end of the maturity spectrum. Similar to Panel A, Column 4 helps show that an increase in MV-1 due to gap-filling by the firm in short-or medium-term can also result in lowering of yields on the firm's long-term bonds. We also include several firm-specific and bond-specific control variables, but for brevity, we report coefficients only on the main variables. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. z-statistics using robust standard errors clustered at the investor level are in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The first potential explanation is related to the fact that greater maturity variety helps the firm to match its asset and liability maturity. That is, a greater maturity variety may be the optimal structure of borrowing, given the maturity structure of the firm's cash flows. This would make the firm less risky and more reliable from the investor's perspective. We control for this alternative in different ways. First, we explicitly control for the firm's riskiness in both the holdings and yield regressions. 21 Second, we explicitly control for the firm's asset maturity and find our results to be robust. Third, we find that primarymarket offer-yields are lower when there are larger institutional investors in the vicinity of the firm; this seems to suggest an explanation based on information collection. Fourth, the results in Section 4 show that new fund flows are allocated to firms in which sister funds also have larger holdings. This result only short-term debt, as it is too risky for investors to lend long term. This implies that while greater maturity variety may signal relatively better credit ratings, a concentrated maturity structure (i.e., only short-term debt) may signal worse credit ratings. Therefore, the market will prefer the former to the latter. Note that this alternative explanation is based on the existence of a unique optimal maturity. Our results, however, point to a preference for a "plurality" of maturities rather than an optimal maturity of debt. Moreover, this alternative hypothesis à la Diamond (1991a) is also based on credit risk and therefore subject to the same arguments we made in the previous paragraph.
In general, our findings may also be the result of firms' decision to span multiple maturities for reasons unrelated to those that we propose. In this case, the bond-holding institutions would merely be passive investors. In other words, one may argue that the findings documented in the paper are not a "demand effect" (i.e., due to demand from bond investors) but simply a "supply effect" (i.e., a result of the firm's decision to span multiple maturities). To address this possibility, we conduct explicit tests of the firm's choice of bond maturity at issuance while controlling for determinants of bond maturity that are known in the literature (e.g., Guedes and Opler 1996) . These results are reported in Table  A -11 of the Internet Appendix.
Conclusion
We study how institutional investments in the corporate bond market are affected by a firm's decision to offer a greater variety of bond maturities. We argue that a firm's greater maturity variety (MV) reduces the informationcollection costs of institutional investors that invest in bonds of various maturities. As a result, institutional investors tilt their portfolios toward firms that issue bonds across various maturities ("high-MV firms").
We test this hypothesis using a sample of U.S. corporations over the period 1998-2007. We create three different measures of a bond-issuing firm's maturity variety. We show that the preference of institutional investors for high-MV firms translates into a higher likelihood of investment and a larger portfolio weight in the bonds of such firms. The effects are stronger when the firm is riskier, as the institutional investor's comparative advantage in collecting information is greater in this case. The effect of greater maturity variety on an investor's portfolio weight is positively related to the ability of the institutional investor to exploit the credit information across investments in different types of bonds. As such, this effect is mostly concentrated in the subset of larger institutional investors and among institutional investors that tend to invest across various maturities.
If we directly focus on the individual funds managed by an institutional investor, we find that a fund's demand for the bonds of a firm strongly depends on the demand of its "sister" funds for bonds of the same firm. This suggests that information is shared across funds of the same institutional investor and the funds are encouraged to coordinate their bond investments.
The greater holdings and weights of the bonds of high-MV firms appear to have a direct price effect, resulting in lower yields in both primary and secondary markets. Overall, our findings provide an analysis of the bond market under segmentation and show that optimization of information-collection costs can induce institutional investors to invest more in firms that offer a variety of maturities.
Appendix: Definitions of the main variables
Here we provide definitions of the variables used in our empirical analyses. We use the terms "institutional investor" or simply "investor" to denote variables defined at the level of investment companies (such as Fidelity or Prudential, etc.), which can comprise multiple funds. We distinguish these from variables denoted by the term "fund," which are constructed for individual funds such as a fund in the Fidelity or Prudential complex.
Dependent variables
• For all investors that hold any bonds of another firm in the same credit-rating category as the given firm, we define the dependent variable Investor's Portfolio-Weight Dummy, which is a dummy variable indicating whether an institutional investor holds any bonds of the firm in a given quarter. We categorize all firms into the following credit-rating groups: all firms without ratings are assigned to a rating group 0, and those with ratings are divided into four groups. • Investor's Portfolio Weight is the percentage of an institutional investor's portfolio invested in a firm's bonds in a given quarter. It is calculated every quarter as the ratio of the investment by investor i in all the bonds of the j th firm to all the bonds in the same rating category that this investor holds in its portfolio. By definition, this variable has missing values if the institutional investor holds no bonds of the given firm; that is, the values of this variable are conditional on the bond holdings being positive. • Investor's Overweighting is the difference between the weight that an investor assigns to a firm's bonds in its portfolio and the market weight of the firm in a portfolio consisting of all outstanding bonds within the same rating category. It is calculated as the difference between the variable Investor's Portfolio Weight and the firm's "market" weight described above. As such, it is also missing if the investor holds no bonds of the given firm.
• Institutional Bond Ownership is the overall institutional bond ownership measured as a percentage of the firm's total bonds outstanding. portfolio that is invested in a firm. Depending on the specification, this is calculated either using all the bonds of a firm or bonds of a specific maturity.
Independent variables of interest
• MV-1 is the inverse of a concentration measure of the firm's bonds, calculated by maturitythe less concentrated the bonds in fewer maturities, the greater is this variable. The variable is constructed as the logarithm of (1 / Herfindahl of the firm's bonds by maturity).
• MV-2 is the ratio of all the different maturities of the firm's outstanding bonds to the number of different bonds that are currently outstanding; for example, if the firm has a 1-year bond, two 3-year bonds, and a 7-year bond, then the ratio is 3/4.
• MV-3 is a discrete variable that measures the presence of a firm across the various bondmaturity bins-the more maturity bins that the firm has outstanding bonds in, the higher the maturity-variety variable. To construct MV-3, we first define three bins of maturities: short term (less than 5 years), medium term (5-10 years), and long term (over 10 years), and then count a maturity bin if the firm has at least 20% of its outstanding bonds in that maturity bin. Therefore, MV-3 takes values 1, 2, or 3.
• Sister Funds' Portfolio Weight is the percentage of the sister funds' portfolios invested in all the bonds of the same firm in the given quarter. Sister funds are funds belonging to the same institutional investor as the given fund.
• 'Portfolio Weight (in Other Maturities) is Large that is defined above. Specifically, the former takes a value of 1 if the latter is 0, and vice versa.
• Fund Flows is the net growth in the fund's assets beyond reinvested dividends, and is calculated using the formula in Sirri and Tufano (1998) .
Other important independent variables
• Total Bonds Outstanding is the logarithm of one plus the face value of bonds outstanding (in thousands of dollars).
• Average Bonds Maturity is the weighted average maturity of all outstanding bonds of the given firm in which the weights are the respective face values of those bonds.
• Competitors' Avg. MV is the average maturity variety across all other firms in the same industry and rating group. A firm's maturity variety is proxied either by MV-1, and Competitors' Avg. MV is the average of the corresponding proxy. All firms are categorized into forty-eight industries per Fama and French (1997) . All firms without ratings are assigned to a rating group 0, and those with ratings are divided into four groups.
• Simultaneous Bond Offerings by Competitors is a measure of the average size of bond offerings made by other "competing" firms in the same quarter as the given firm's issue. "Competing" firms are those that belong to the same industry and rating group as the given firm. • Investor's TNA is a proxy for the investor's size and is measured as the logarithm of aggregate bond holdings of that investor. • Fund's TNA is the logarithm of aggregate bond holdings of the individual fund.
• T-Bill Rates is the percentage rate offered on a contemporaneous Treasury bill that is closest in maturity to the bond issued by the firm.
Firm-specific control variables
• Firm Size is the logarithm of sales, which is measured in millions of dollars.
• Leverage is the ratio of debt to debt plus equity. Here debt includes long-term debt and debt in current liabilities.
• Market-to-Book is the ratio of market equity to book equity.
• Cash is the cash holdings as a fraction of lagged assets.
• Cash Flow is the sum of earnings and depreciation as a fraction of lagged assets.
• Z-score is the Altman (1968) Z-score for bankruptcy risk. It is [3.3 x pre-tax income + sales + 1.4 x retained earnings + 1.2 x (current assets -current liabilities) + 0.6 x market equity]/book assets.
• Tangibility is the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets.
• Relationship Banking is a dummy variable that marks whether the firm has any relationship banking currently.
• Asset Maturity is time pattern of cash flows generated from a firm's assets. It is defined using the formula in Guedes and Opler (1996) .
Bond-specific control variables
• Convertible in the demand regressions is the average of a dummy variable measuring convertibility across bonds of that firm. Covenants, Private Placement, and Callable in the demand regressions are measured similarly.
• Issue Size in the bond-yield regressions is the logarithm of the size of the bond offering.
• Medium-/Long-term Maturity in the bond-yield regressions are two dummy variables that equal 1 if the bond offered is a medium-or long-term bond, respectively. Along with a similarly defined Short-term Maturity dummy, these would sum to 1. Categories of bond maturities are defined in the same manner as in MV-3.
• Convertible in the bond-yield regressions is a dummy variable indicating that the offered bond is convertible. Dummy variable Covenants in the bond-yield regressions is defined similarly.
• Rule 415 Regulation in the bond-yield regressions is a dummy variable indicating that it is a delayed or continuous bond offering.
• Rule 144A in the bond-yield regressions is a dummy variable indicating private placement of the bond offering.
• Bonds Liquidity in the secondary-market yield regressions is the logarithm of one plus the average number of bonds traded every month.
